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Abstract 
Previous research on military conscription exclusively focuses on the effect of military service 
on subsequent labor market outcomes. I examine the effect of peacetime conscription on early 
labor market outcomes of potential conscripts before they are called up for service. In a simple 
theoretical framework with costly job search and no job security, I show that an expected 
interruption in civilian life reduces the incentive of teenagers to search for a job. Using micro-
data from Turkey, Argentina, Peru and Spain, I present evidence that the anticipation of 
compulsory conscription reduces the labor force participation of teenage men by 6.7 percent 
compared to men in their twenties, and employment by 11 percent, while raising unemployment 
in this group by 9 percent. Interestingly, I find mirroring effects on teenage women who are not 
subject to conscription. Women experience a 7.5 percent decrease in the labor force participation 
and a 10-13 percent decrease in employment after the abolition of conscription, suggesting a 
high degree of substitutability between men and women. 
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1. Introduction 
Throughout the twentieth century, the armed forces in many countries recruited personnel 
through conscription. Given the compulsory military service (CMS) laws, a significant portion of 
sixty year-old males around the world served in the military when they were young. However, 
since the end of the Cold War many countries have moved from conscription to all-volunteer 
armies, especially in North America and Europe. France, considered the first country to 
introduce modern conscription, abolished it in 1997, and most recently Germany abolished 
conscription in 2011. Yet some European countries and many Asian and African countries 
including Austria, Brazil, Greece, Denmark, Egypt, Israel, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey still 
use conscription to supply their armed forces with qualified personnel. Among the latter group, 
the duration of compulsory service and the possibility of eliminating it have frequently been 
debated. Turkey is now reducing the duration of compulsory service from 15 months to 12 
months. The decision to switch from a conscription army to a professional one is partly strategic 
and partly economic.   
In this paper, I examine the effect of peacetime conscription on the early labor market outcomes 
of potential conscripts before they are called up for service. Using micro-data from four 
countries, I present evidence that the existence of compulsory conscription reduces the labor 
force participation and employment of male teenagers who are waiting to be called into service. 
Similarly, I observe an increase in male teenage employment and a decrease in female teenage 
employment after the abolition of conscription. The economic effects in advance of conscription 
have not been studied previously, to my knowledge. 
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I use both cross-country and within-country strategies to investigate the effect of peacetime 
conscription on the early labor market outcomes of potential conscripts before they are called up 
for service. In a simple theoretical model with costly job search and no job security, I show that 
an expected interruption in civilian life reduces the incentive of teenagers to search for a job. 
Moreover, when firms bear the cost of on-the-job training, an expected interruption may reduce 
the employers’ likelihood of offering a job to expected future conscripts. 
I use labor force survey micro-data from Turkey (which has CMS), Argentina and Peru (which 
do not have CMS), and Spain, which eliminated it in 2001. My results show that CMS decreases 
the labor force participation and employment of male teenagers at ages at which they are waiting 
to be called into service. I also show that the existence of CMS in Spain reduced the chance of 
finding a job, and that its elimination increased employment of teenage men while decreasing 
employment of teenage women. 
I start my analysis by pointing out the low labor force participation of males in their late teens in 
Turkey, focusing on young men who finished their schooling at an early age and comparing them 
to men in their twenties with the same level of education. The differences between the two 
groups may reflect unobserved characteristics that keep teenage men out of the labor force. To 
test this possibility, I incorporate data from the “control” countries, Peru and Argentina, and 
show that, although labor force participation trends are very similar in all three countries among 
men in their twenties with the same level of education, labor force participation is significantly 
lower in Turkey among teenage men. Finally, using the Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA) 
before and after Spain abolished CMS in 2001, I present within-country evidence that the 
abolition of CMS increased the labor force participation and employment of teenage men and 
decreased it for teenage women. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, I find that the 
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abolition of CMS increased the labor force participation of teenage men by 5.9 percentage points 
(6.7 percent) compared to men in their twenties and increased their employment by 6.7 
percentage points (11 percent). Therefore it decreased the likelihood of unemployment by around 
3.1 percentage points (9 percent). Finally, I find mirroring results for teenage women, suggesting 
substitutability in the labor market. Teenage women experience a 7.5 percent decrease in the 
labor force participation after the abolition of conscription. 
The first contribution of this study is to highlight the anticipation effects of CMS, as the previous 
literature focuses on the effect of military service on subsequent labor market outcomes only. By 
showing the ex-ante effects of CMS, I point out one cause of low labor force participation among 
youth in the countries with CMS, which is a common concern around the world.  
Second, I show one channel through which conscription may affect future labor market outcomes 
of individuals. It is well documented that early labor market experiences have significant effects 
on later labor market outcomes (Smith, 1985). This channel that occurs before conscription may 
partially explain why the previous literature finds either negative or no effect of conscription on 
later wages, even though some hypothesize that the effect should be positive. Third, Galiani et al 
(2011) exploit the Argentine draft lottery and show that military conscription raises the 
likelihood of later criminal activity, particularly property crimes. This study highlights another 
channel through which this may occur, involving the lack of teenage labor market experience. 
Similarly, Jacob and Lefgren (2003) show that idleness among high school students causes them 
to engage in more property crimes. Finally, I exploit a credible natural experiment to 
demonstrate the substitutability in the labor market across types of workers. 
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In the next section, I review the literature on the effects of military service. Section 3 provides a 
brief institutional background of CMS in the four countries. Section 4 presents a theoretical 
framework that motivates the effect of CMS on teenage labor market outcomes. Section 5 
describes the data sets and the key variables, and explains my sample selection from each 
country. Section 6 covers the empirical strategy and presents the results. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The economics literature informs the debate about compulsory military service in a number of 
ways. One branch of the literature analyzes the budgetary and opportunity cost of a conscription 
army versus a professional army given the goal of supplying the armed forces with qualified 
personnel (Warner and Asch 2001).  Another branch investigates how the existence of CMS 
affects aggregate labor market characteristics relative to other countries with no CMS. Given the 
high number of countries switching from conscription to professional armies in the last two 
decades, it is surprising that there is little evidence on aggregate labor market effects (Feldman, 
2009). 
Finally, a recent branch of the literature examines the effect of military service on individual 
outcomes such as labor market performance, educational attainment, cigarette and alcohol 
consumption, and criminal activity.  These papers use within-country variation in veteran status 
across citizens and generally attempt to find exogenous variation in veteran status. Angrist 
(1990) and  Angrist and Krueger (1994) investigate the effect of serving in the U.S. military 
during wartime on future labor market outcomes in an instrumental variables framework, 
whereas Imbens and van der  Klaauw (1995) and others examine the effect of peacetime 
conscription in Europe. Bound and Turner (2002) and Barr (2013) investigate whether military 
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service increased veterans’ educational attainment through G.I. benefits in the U.S., and 
Goldberg et al (1991), Eisemberg and Rowe (2009), and Galiani et al (2011) estimate the effect 
on later substance use and criminal behavior.1 This paper belongs to the second and third 
branches of the literature by using both cross-country and within-country empirical strategies and 
by focusing on individual outcomes. 
I focus attention here on papers that analyze labor market outcomes as a result of conscription. 
As mentioned above, the frequent switches from a conscription army to a professional army 
provides variation in conscription status across countries. Yet most cross-country studies in the 
literature examine the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth using 
cross-section or panel data on the expenditure and economic growth of countries (Stroup and 
Heckelman, 2001; Deger and Sen, 1995; Shieh et al, 2002). Keller et al (2009) focus on 
conscription and examine the relationship between conscription and economic growth in OECD 
countries. Feldman (2009) uses data on 73 economies to investigate the effect of labor regulation 
on unemployment around the world. He finds that, no or short military conscription is correlated 
with lower unemployment among the total labor force. Yet none of these studies investigates the 
causal link between conscription and labor market outcomes in depth. In this study, I use cross-
country comparisons to present evidence on the effect of conscription on aggregate labor market 
characteristics. 
Identifying the effect of conscription on individual outcomes is a difficult task because there is 
non-random selection to the military service. Even countries with universal conscription allow 
certain exemptions based on characteristics such as health and occupation. Thus comparing the 
                                                          
1 The literature on draft avoidance behavior of individuals can be considered as investigating the ex-ante effects of 
conscription on educational attainment (Card and Lemieux, 2002; Maurin and Xenogiani, 2007).  
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individual outcomes of interest between veterans and non-veterans is misleading unless the 
researcher also controls carefully for the characteristics that determine the veteran status. 
However, data on such characteristics are rarely available to the researchers. For example, if the 
army recruits its members after medical and psychological examinations, an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimate of the effect of military service on labor market outcomes would be 
upward biased. If men with relatively fewer civilian opportunities are more likely to enlist in the 
military or men from wealthy families are less likely to enlist, an empirical approach that does 
not control for civilian earnings potential or family background would underestimate the benefit 
or overestimate the cost of military service (Angrist, 1990; Angrist and Krueger, 1994). Some 
papers that focus on individual outcomes therefore use instrumental variables to explain military 
service, while others, like this paper, obtain intent-to-treat estimates on the cohorts who are 
eligible for military conscription. 
Angrist (1990) and Angrist and Krueger (1994) investigate the effect of wartime military service 
during Vietnam War and World War II on future labor market outcomes, and use date of birth as 
an instrumental variable for the probability of being drafted. These studies found that white 
Vietnam-era veterans earn 15 percent lower annual wages than non-veterans 10 years after the 
war, and World War II veterans earn no more, possibly less, than non-veterans. Imbens and van 
der Klaauw (1995) use variation in the aggregate military enrollment rates across cohorts in a 
grouped-data IV framework to identify the causal effect of peacetime military service in the 
Netherlands on future earnings. They find that, 10 years after service, those who served in the 
military earn 5 percent lower annual wages than those who did not. Grenet et al (2011) exploit 
the discontinuous change in the probability of conscription into the British army during the post-
war period in a regression discontinuity design (RDD) and find no effect on earnings of 
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peacetime compulsory military service. Similarly, Bauer et al (2012) use RDD based on a 
discontinuity in the probability of being drafted across cohorts in Germany and find no 
significant effect of conscription on future wage or employment of the former conscripts. Paloyo 
(2010) revisits conscription in Germany in a difference-in-differences framework and verifies 
that CMS has no effect on the labor market performance of conscripts. 
The papers mentioned above focus on the effect of military service on future labor market 
outcomes. Also, it is worth noting that they identify the Local Average Treatment Effect, with 
treatment being the actual conscription. My approach differs because I investigate the ex-ante 
outcomes of CMS before the actual call to service. My findings should be interpreted as Intent-
to-Treat estimates, or the effect of the existence of conscription in a country. In this sense my 
work is similar to the study from the retirement literature by Friedberg (2003) who points out 
that impending retirement reduces the incentive of older workers to invest in new computer 
skills. This is because approaching retirement reduces the time to recoup the investment in new 
skills. It is also important to note that wartime conscription may have different effects than 
peacetime conscription. Although both types of military service cause a loss of job market 
experience among those who serve, the war-time military service has a higher physical and 
psychological cost. 
3. The Institutional Background 
In the first part of the empirical analysis I compare Turkey, which still has CMS, to Peru and 
Argentina, middle-income countries which abolished CMS in 1999 and 1995, respectively.2 To 
do this, I use labor force micro data for the years 2004-2011 for each of these countries. Then, I 
                                                          
2 It should be noted that, in both countries, the government retains the right for conscription in case of emergency. 
Yet in practice both armies currently consist of volunteers.  
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use Spanish micro-data before and after the abolition of conscription in 2001 to estimate the 
effect on ex-ante labor market outcomes of individuals. In this section, I first describe the 
“treatment”, focusing on the institutional details of CMS in Turkey. Then, I switch to the details 
of control group countries, Peru and Argentina. Finally, I present the institutional details of 
military service in Spain before and after the abolition of CMS. 
Conscription in Turkey was introduced in 1916. Since then, all able-bodied men have to enlist in 
the military when they turn 20.3 All men from a particular cohort are called for medical and 
psychological examinations around their 19th birthdays. Those who are fit for service are called 
up when they turn 20.  A second group of men who have temporary health problems are deferred 
from service.  A third group of men who have severe health problems or extreme BMI values are 
permanently exempted from military service. Unlike some other countries, there is no exemption 
based on one’s occupation.4 Thus, the number of permanent exemptions is negligible. Those who 
are required to serve are not necessarily called up immediately. Individuals who are enrolled in 
higher education can defer their military service until they reach 29. High school graduates or 
two-year college graduates can defer their service until the age of 22 or 23. These age differences 
in service requirements are a major reason that I focus most of my analysis on people who have 
completed their education at a younger age. 
The duration of CMS in Turkey has changed several times throughout the century reaching its 
maximum during World War II. A legal change in 2003 shortened the duration of CMS from 18 
months to 15 months. The most recent change was made in October 2013, and it shortened the 
                                                          
3 Women are exempt from compulsory military service in Turkey, but they are allowed to join the army as 
professional military officers. 
4 For example, police and fire men are not exempt from the military service. Yet there are other forms of 
exemptions. For example, a man whose brother lost his life during military service or was seriously injured is 
exempt from compulsory military service. The laws do not allow conscientious objection. 
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duration of service form 15 months to 12 months effective January 2014. As will be explained in 
the next section, the data from Turkey, Argentina and Peru cover the years 2004-2011. The 
duration of CMS in Turkey was 15 months for most men during these years. Yet military service 
duration varies depending on one’s higher education status. Those who have four-year college 
degree either serve for 12 months as an officer candidate among military officers, or for 6 
months as a sergeant among enlisted soldiers. The final allocation of college graduates between 
12-month service and 6-month service depends on both individual preferences and the 
necessities of the army. Men who studied in certain fields, such as medicine or engineering, are 
more likely to be assigned 12-month officer jobs. Unlike the other conscripts, college graduates 
who serve for 12 months are paid.5 All conscripts receive basic training for around two months 
and after that they are allocated to their divisions for active duty. Although the exact number of 
conscripts has varied over time, the Turkish armed forces comprise around 200,000 officers and 
professional soldiers and around 400,000 conscripts. 
Peru modified its military service act in 1999 and made military service voluntary for any 
physically and mentally-able Peruvian aged 18-30. After the switch to a professional army, the 
government increased the benefits of joining the armed forces by providing technical job training 
and education benefits. Currently the Peruvian armed forces comprise around 120,000 active- 
duty personnel in total. Compulsory military service in Argentina was created in 1901 and was 
suspended after the murder of an 18 year-old conscript by two soldiers in 1994. Before the 
suspension, 18-year old Argentineans were randomly selected and recruited for 14 months. In the 
all-volunteer army, soldiers are paid for their service and they can stay in the armed forces up to 
                                                          
5 In practice all conscripts receive extremely small, symbolic salaries. 
10 
 
ten years. The number of active personnel in the Argentinean armed forces is around 70,000. 
Neither of these countries had CMS between 2004 and 2011. 
The length of compulsory military service in Spain was nine months, shorter than the fifteen 
months in Turkey, before its abolition in December 2001. The total armed forces comprised 
around 250,000 personnel in 1999, and conscripts constituted more than half of it. By 2002, the 
size of the armed forces was below 200,000. Before the abolition of conscription in Spain, men 
were called up for physical and psychological examination before the age of 19. Those who were 
fit for service were called up in the year that they turn 19. Individuals who had temporary health 
problems could defer the service. Those who were not physically or mentally fit for military 
service were permanently exempt, as in Turkey. 
Also as in Turkey, those who were not exempt from military service did not necessarily begin to 
serve immediately. There were a number of reasons for deferring military service. One common 
reason for deferment was education. Individuals who were enrolled in school could defer the 
military service for as many as seven years. Conscientious objection was also popular in Spain. 
According to Spanish law conscientious objectors were allowed to do alternative public service 
in institutions such as hospitals for the same duration and pay. The ratio of conscientious 
objectors for military service in 2001 to those who actually enrolled in the armed forces for 
serving in 2001 was more than a quarter, but one’s status as conscientious objector should not 
alter the ex-ante effects of conscription on labor markets. 
The intent of the Spanish government to abolish compulsory service was known as early as 1999. 
Initially the laws said that CMS would be abolished by the end of 2002. In early 2001, another 
law changed the end of conscription to December 2001. Similar to the draft avoidance behavior 
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of individuals in Card and Lemieux (2002) and Maurin and Xenogiani (2007), this information 
might have led more individuals to stay in school and defer military service. For those who 
deferred service in 2000 and 2001, the deferment practically meant an exemption from military 
service. 
The institutional details of compulsory military service in Spain affect my analysis in two 
important ways. First, since individuals who are enrolled in school at the conscription age can 
easily defer military service, I exclude college graduates and those who were enrolled in school 
when surveyed. I concentrate on those who finish schooling at a relatively early age, at or before 
sixteen. This way, the individuals in my sample are more likely to be affected by CMS laws and 
its abolition. Second, the fact that individuals expected the abolition of the conscription would 
make them more likely to ignore the possibility of conscription and join the labor force. Thus, 
the estimated effect of the existence of CMS in Spain should be a lower bound. 
4. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, I present a simple three-period model with costly job search and no job security to 
illustrate labor force participation decisions of individuals in their late teens. I show that an 
expected interruption in civilian life in period 2 reduces the incentive of teenagers to search for a 
job in period 1.6 Comparative statics analysis provides some testable predictions that I 
investigate empirically. When we look at the employer side, similar results would also arise in 
three-period model of hiring with on the-job-training. An expected interruption reduces the 
incentive of employers to hire workers in the first period. Although the theoretical framework 
                                                          
6 The same effect may arise if continuous labor market experience is more valuable, in terms of building human 
capital, than interrupted labor market experience. 
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presented here aims to show the effect of compulsory military service, it applies to any expected 
interruption in the civilian life. 
4.1. Labor Force Participation Decision 
I focus on a three period model in which individuals may be exogenously called up for military 
service in the second period. Three periods represent the early labor market experience of young 
men in a country with compulsory conscription. The first period can be thought of as the late 
teenage years, the years before the conscription age. The second period can be thought of as the 
conscription age, at which young men may be called up for the service. The third period 
corresponds to the years after the conscription age. 
In the model, individuals begin life without a job. Each period, individuals receive non-wage 
benefit, 𝑐, regardless of their employment status. This benefit represents home production, 
family support or the very small compensation given in the army. Individuals discount future 
periods by a discount factor, 𝛽, where 0< 𝛽<1. They can be called up for military service in the 
second period with exogenous probability 𝜂. In the first period, they decide whether to search for 
a job. Job search is a costly effort that happens at the beginning of a period. I assume that anyone 
who pays the search cost, 𝑧, finds a job. Individuals who find a job start working in the same 
period and receive a wage, 𝑤, for that period. Once an individual finds a job, there is no 
separation unless he is conscripted into the army in the second period, in which case he loses his 
job. If an individual who worked in the first period is called up for service in the second period, 
he needs to search for a job in the third period if he wants to work. Everyone knows whether or 
not he will be called up for military service at the beginning of the second period. Therefore, an 
individual who worked in the first period does not start working in the second period if he is 
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called up. Similarly, an individual who did not work in the first period does not pay a search cost 
in the second period if he knows that he will join the armed forces. 
Individuals optimize between searching and not searching at the onset of each period in which 
they do not have jobs and are not in the armed forces. Each individual balances the cost of search 
with the wage benefit of employment considering the probability of losing his job due to 
compulsory conscription. The benefits differ across periods. The search cost, 𝑧, differs across 
individuals but stays the same for each individual across periods. Although the cost of search, 𝑧, 
has a distribution 𝑓(𝑧) across individuals, I will use a generic 𝑧 in the following model, and refer 
to the distribution at the end. 
I approach the optimization problem in a recursive way. There is no decision making for 
individuals who worked in the second period. They continue working in the third period. 
However, an individual who did not work in the second period, either because he lost his job due 
to compulsory conscription or he did not search for a job in the first two periods, compares the 
search cost and the wage of the last period. In the third period, the value function for an 
individual who did not work in the second period is          
𝑉3 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ, 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ} =  𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑐, 𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤3}. 
Individuals who worked in the first period continue working in the second and third period if 
they are not called up for military service. In addition, there is no decision making for conscripts 
in the second period. However, civilian individuals who did not work in the first period choose 
whether or not to search in the second period. If they search in the second period, they will not 
need to search again in the third period. In the second period, the relevant value function for a 
civilian individual who did not work before is 
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𝑉2 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ, 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ} = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑐 + 𝛽𝑉3, 𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤2 + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑤3)}. 
In the first period, individuals decide whether or not to search taking into account the probability 
of conscription in the second period. The value function for an individual in the first period is 
𝑉1 = {𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ, 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ} 
𝑉1 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑐 +  𝛽[𝜂 (𝑐 + 𝛽𝑉3) + (1 − 𝜂)𝑉2],
𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤1 + 𝛽[𝜂 (𝑐 + 𝛽𝑉3) +  (1 − 𝜂)(𝑐 + 𝑤2 + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑤3))]}. 
Since the value of the choice in the third period affects the choices in the previous periods as 
well, one should know whether a jobless individual searches in the third period. There are two 
possible cases regarding the choice in the third period based on the value of search cost relative 
to the wage in the third period. 
Case 1: No search in the third period: 
Assuming that 𝑧 > w3, an individual does not search in the last period if he does not have a job 
at that point. Thus, 𝑉3 boils down to 𝑉3̅ = 𝑐. Individuals do not find it worth paying the search 
cost for the third period wage only. A civilian individual who is not called up for service and 
who did not work in the first period knows that if he does not search in the second period he will 
only get 𝑉3̅ = 𝑐 in the third period. So his problem in the second period becomes 
𝑉2 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑐 + 𝛽𝑐, 𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤2 + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑤3)}. 
Assuming that 𝑧 < 𝑤2 + 𝛽𝑤3, a jobless civilian individual chooses to search in the second 
period.7 Then 𝑉2boils down to 𝑉2̅ =  𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤2 + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑤3). So when individuals start the first 
                                                          
7 We can also consider the case with 𝑤2 + 𝛽𝑤3 < 𝑧. Then, civilian individuals who did not work in the first period 
do not search in the second period. This makes jobless civilian individuals indifferent between conscription and 
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period, they know that if they choose not to search and they are not called up for military service, 
then the discounted value at the beginning of the second period will be 𝑉2̅ =  𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤2 +
𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑤3). Then, individuals at the beginning of the first period face the problem 
  
𝑉1 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑐 +  𝛽[ 𝜂 (𝑐 + 𝛽𝑐) +  (1 − 𝜂) (𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤2 + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑤3))],
𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤1 + 𝛽[𝜂 (𝑐 + 𝛽𝑐) +  (1 − 𝜂)(𝑐 + 𝑤2 + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑤3))]}. 
This choice reduces to comparing – 𝛽 (1 − 𝜂)𝑧  with –z+ 𝑤1. An individual in the first period 
chooses not to search if – 𝛽 (1 − 𝜂)𝑧  > –z+ 𝑤1 i.e. 𝑧 >
 𝑤1
(1− 𝛽+𝛽𝜂)
, and chooses to search if 𝑧 <
 𝑤1
(1− 𝛽+𝛽𝜂)
. 
The threshold value of the search cost is ?̂? =
 𝑤1
(1− 𝛽+𝛽𝜂)
, and I will discuss comparative statics 
later. If individual search cost 𝑧𝑖 is smaller than ?̂?, then an individual pays the search cost in the 
first period and starts working. If 𝑧𝑖 is bigger than ?̂?, then the individual does not find it worth 
paying the search cost and stays out of the labor force in the first period. We should also check 
the previous two assumptions. The assumptions w3 < 𝑧 and 𝑧 < 𝑤2 + 𝛽𝑤3 do not restrict the z 
values too much. There is a range of z values that satisfies w3 < 𝑧 < 𝑤2 + 𝛽𝑤3, and  lead some 
individuals to search and others not to search in the first period.  
Case 2: Search in the third period:  
If we assume that 𝑧 <  w3, then individuals with such 𝑧 values search in the third period if they 
do not have jobs at that point. Then, 𝑉3 boils down to 𝑉3̅ = c − z + w3. The optimization 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
civilian life in the second period. In either case, they will receive the non-wage benefit, 𝑐, in the second and third 
periods. Then, there is a threshold value for 𝑧 above which individuals do not search in the first period either.   
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problem of a civilian individual in the second period who is not called up for service and who did 
not work in the first period becomes 
𝑉2 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑐 + 𝛽(𝑐 − 𝑧 + w3) ,   𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤2 + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑤3)}. 
He chooses to search in the second period as long as 𝑤2 − 𝑧 > −𝛽𝑧  𝑖. 𝑒.  𝑧 <
𝑤2
1−𝛽
. Assuming 
that he searches, 𝑉2 becomes 𝑉2̅ =  𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤2 + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑤3).
8 Thus, individuals at the beginning 
of the first period face the following choice 
𝑉1 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑐 +  𝛽[ 𝜂 (𝑐 + 𝛽(𝑐 − 𝑧 + w3)) +  (1 − 𝜂) (𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤2 + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑤3))]  ,
𝑐 − 𝑧 + 𝑤1 + 𝛽[𝜂 (𝑐 + 𝛽(𝑐 − 𝑧 + w3) ) +  (1 − 𝜂)(𝑐 + 𝑤2 + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑤3))]}. 
An individual at the beginning of the first period chooses not to search if 𝑧 >
 𝑤1
(1− 𝛽+𝛽𝜂)
, and 
chooses to search if 𝑧 <
 𝑤1
(1− 𝛽+𝛽𝜂)
. Here, we should check the previous two assumptions. There 
is a range of 𝑧 values that satisfies 𝑧 < 𝑤3 and <
𝑤2
1−𝛽
 , and  lead some individuals to search and 
others not to search in the first period. 
Tables 1 and 2 show search behavior of individuals with different values of 𝑧𝑖 , given two 
possible wage sequences. For the first case, the threshold values for the three periods are ?̂? =
 𝑤1
(1− 𝛽+𝛽𝜂)
, 𝑤2 + 𝛽𝑤3 and 𝑤3, respectively.  For the second case, they are ?̂? =
 𝑤1
(1− 𝛽+𝛽𝜂)
, 
𝑤2
1−𝛽
, and 
𝑤3, respectively. In almost any wage structure, we expect that 
𝑤2
1−𝛽
> 𝑤2 + 𝛽𝑤3 > 𝑤3. Yet, the 
threshold value of the search cost in the first period, ?̂? =
 𝑤1
(1− 𝛽+𝛽𝜂)
, can be smaller or larger than 
                                                          
8 There is potentially another case. If w3 > 𝑧 >
𝑤2
1−𝛽
 then a jobless civilian individual who is not conscripted does 
not search in the second period although he is willing to search in the third period. Because 𝛽 is typically close to 1, 
this case is unlikely to realize unless the third period wage is far bigger than the second period wage. 
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𝑤3. Table 1 illustrates the search behavior of individuals where ?̂? =
 𝑤1
(1− 𝛽+𝛽𝜂)
> 𝑤3, and Table 2 
does the same where ?̂? =
 𝑤1
(1− 𝛽+𝛽𝜂)
< 𝑤3. 9 Note that first period search is monotonic in the 
search cost. Table 1 shows that, for intermediate values of the search cost, someone may search 
in the first period, but will not search in the third period if they are drafted in the second period. 
Similarly, Table 2 shows that, for intermediate values of the search cost, some people will not 
search in the first period and then search in the third period if they are drafted in the second. In 
both tables, as the threshold value of the search cost decreases, fewer individuals search in the 
first period.  
In either of the cases above, the threshold value for searching in the first period can be defined 
for the ratio of search cost to first-period wage. This threshold value is 
𝑧
𝑤1
̂ =
1
1−𝛽+𝛽𝜂
. If the search 
cost-first period wage ratio exceeds this value, then an individual does not search in the first 
period.  
4.2. Comparative Statics 
Next, I use the model to develop predictions for the effect of conscription regulations on the 
search effort of young men. 
i. The model shows that anything that affects the threshold value for the search cost, 𝑧,̂ affects the 
labor force participation of young men. Given 𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3, and discount factor 𝛽, and an 
underlying distribution of  𝑧, 𝑓(𝑧), the first partial derivative of ?̂? =
 𝑤1
(1− 𝛽+𝛽𝜂)
 with respect to 𝜂 
is negative. Therefore, as the probability of conscription in a country increases, the mass of 
individuals with a 𝑧 value less than ?̂? gets smaller, and less people join the labor force in the first 
                                                          
9 One can consider more different wage structures using the same reasoning. 
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period. Equivalently, if a country abolishes conscription, ?̂? increases, and labor force 
participation among young men increases as well. A similar reasoning applies to cross-country 
analysis. 
ii. Everything else constant an increase in the first period wage increases the threshold value for 
first period search, 𝑧.̂ The cumulative distribution 𝐹(?̂? ) increases and we observe more people 
with search cost values under the threshold. This implies that if the wage rate for teenage men 
increases, more men join the labor force before they reach the age of conscription. 
iii. An increase in the discount factor, 𝛽, increases the threshold value for the search cost ?̂?. Thus, 
more people pay the search cost and start working in the first period. As explained above, with 
some probability of conscription, the second and third periods are the same across all individuals 
regardless of their employment status in the first period. The three periods become independent 
from each other, and the discount factor does not affect the first period decision. With some 
probability of not being conscripted, individuals balance cost of search in the first period with the 
cost of search tomorrow, in the second period. An increase in the discount factor makes 
individuals more likely to pay the search cost early. 
As mentioned in Section 2, the ex-ante labor market effect of conscription has received little 
attention. The theoretical framework above shows its potential effects on individuals before they 
are called up for service. Next, I illustrate how compulsory conscription also affects the hiring 
decision of employers. 
4.3. The Hiring Decision 
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Similar results would also arise in a three-period model of hiring with on-the-job training. This 
model looks at the other side of the coin. Employers choose whether or not to hire a job applicant 
considering the expected interruptions in the applicant’s labor market experience. 
Suppose that, rather than a fixed search cost, there is a one-time training cost for all new hires at 
the expense of employer. If a worker leaves the firm due to conscription, then he needs to be 
trained again in his third period. This is in line with many studies that refer to the depreciation 
effects of compulsory conscription.  This also fits to the case where training is firm-specific. If a 
worker who worked for a firm in the first period is called up for military service, he quits the job 
and joins the armed forces in the second period. Once he is back to civilian life in the third 
period, he is no different than other job applicants to employers.10 
In this theoretical framework, in the absence of conscription, an employer would prefer hiring 
someone in the first period of his life because he is able to gain from the productivity of the 
worker for three consecutive periods and only pays the training cost once. The advantage of 
younger applicants compared to older ones decreases as the conscription probability in a country 
increases. Similarly, if a country abolishes conscription completely, the employment likelihood 
of men younger than the age of conscription rises. 
5. Data 
I focus my entire analysis on men (and occasionally women) who finished their schooling at an 
early age, before conscription age, so that schooling and labor force participation decisions are 
not confounded, especially because schooling may lead to deferred conscription. Throughout my 
analysis, I compare men in their late teens and men in their twenties with the same low level of 
                                                          
10 This is consistent with the labor force participation model in section 4.1. There is no job security. 
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education. Because men with different ages may differ for other reasons, I compare statistics for 
men in their late teens and in their late twenties across countries and within Spain before and 
after the abolition of CMS. If there is a common age-labor force participation profile for men in 
their twenties across these countries, but not for men in their late teens when they face CMS, it 
suggests that CMS causes the different outcomes. To undertake this analysis, I incorporate data 
from one country that retains CMS, Turkey, two countries that no longer have CMS, Peru and 
Argentina, and one country that recently abolished CMS, Spain in 2001. Below, I describe the 
data from the four countries. 
Common Definitions 
My theoretical model suggests that in a country with CMS such as Turkey, the existence of 
compulsory conscription would affect the ex-ante labor market outcomes of individuals who are 
about to choose between joining the labor force and waiting for conscription. Therefore, I 
concentrate my empirical examination on young men who finished schooling at relatively early 
ages. College students can defer military service in all three countries and they are already above 
20 when they graduate from college, so they can choose to do military service right after 
graduation. Inefficiency due to anticipation of service is therefore not a serious concern for 
college graduates. Consequently, in all three samples described below, I exclude those who are 
enrolled in school or who have any college education. Unlike urban areas, individuals in rural 
areas, especially with family farms, always have some work to do on the farm. The surveys are 
designed in a way that anyone who finished schooling is considered employed if he works for the 
family business. Therefore, labor force participation or employment figures in the rural areas are 
less informative about labor market decisions and opportunities for young men. Thus, I drop the 
rural population in the three samples. 
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I generate three schooling categories in each country. Those who have primary/elementary 
school degree or less are in the first group. They have six years of schooling or less. Those who 
have a middle school degree in Turkey or are secondary school drop outs in Peru and Argentina 
are the second group. Finally, those who have a high school degree in Turkey or a secondary 
school degree in Peru or Argentina are the third group. In the next section, cross-county analysis 
is carried out separately for these three samples: those who have elementary school degree or 
less, middle school degree or less, and high school degree or less. 
Household Labor Force Survey of Turkey 
I use the 2004-2011 releases of the Household Labor Force Survey, Hanehalkı İşgücü Anketi 
(HİA), conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute. Each survey covers about 150,000 
households and 500,000 individuals annually. This micro-data set is a cross-section. Like other 
labor force surveys around the world, the survey excludes the institutional population such as 
prisoners and conscripts in the armed forces. Therefore, I have fewer observations of men than 
women at the age of 20. Respondents report demographic and detailed labor market 
characteristics. The original public version of the dataset provided individual age in ranges. This 
makes it difficult to see how labor force participation changes within narrow age categories, 
which is needed for this study. I obtained additional files on the exact age of respondents from 
the Institute and merged them with the original data.11 Among many labor market characteristics, 
I focus on whether or not the individual is in the labor force and is actively searching for a job or 
employed. 
                                                          
11 I would like to thank the staff in the Labor Force Statistics Department of Turkish Statistical Institute for 
providing me the access to these supplementary data. 
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I restrict my sample to individuals aged 17-30 in any of the survey years from 2004 to 2011. 
During these years, military service in Turkey was compulsory, as described in Section 3, 15 
months of service were required for non-college graduates. It is worth restating that college 
graduates can defer military service until they finish the college, confounding the opportunity to 
look at behavior during ages at which they are anticipating conscription.  
About 4 percent of the sample between 17 and 30 is missing year of birth information, so I drop 
them. I also drop those who live in rural areas with population less than 20,000. Finally, I drop 
those who were enrolled in school or who have any college degree, leaving 48% of the original 
sample aged 17-30. So I analyze a sample of 419,023 individuals aged 17-30 from survey years 
2004-2011. Table A1 in the Appendix provides sample statistics for the main variables, 
separately for women and men of the baseline sample used in this paper. 
National Household Survey of Peru 
I use the 2004-2011 releases of the National Household Survey, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 
(ENAHO) micro-data to investigate labor force participation across ages in Peru. The survey is 
conducted by the National Statistics Institute of Peru continuously every week. The data set is a 
cross-section with a panel subsample that begins in 2008. Each year the institute surveys more 
than 20,000 households and collects information on employment, income, education and 
household demographics among other things. The survey is organized in 29 modules. For this 
study, I merge the information from modules on household characteristics, education and 
employment status. Since there is a panel structure as well, I drop all duplicates from the data.  
The age variable is defined as the completed age. For comparability across countries, I restrict 
my sample to individuals aged 17-30 in any of the survey years from 2004 to 2011. Peru did not 
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have compulsory military service in any of these survey years. The country had already switched 
to a professional army in 1999. Residential areas are categorized based on the number of 
households. I drop observations from rural areas with fewer than 4,000 households, similar to 
dropping areas with fewer than 20,000 residents in Turkish data. In addition I drop those who 
were enrolled in school or who have any college degree. This leaves 54,132 observations over 
eight years. Table A2 in the Appendix presents sample statistics for the main variables of 
interest, separately for women and men. 
Household Continuous Survey of Argentina  
The data used to investigate Argentina come from the Household Continuous Survey of 
Argentina, Encuesta Permanente De Hogares (EPH). This is a panel household survey conducted 
by the National Institute of Statistics and Census Institute in 31 urban centers populated by at 
least 100,000 residents. The survey contains information on employment, demographic, 
economic and social characteristics of the non-institutional population. The EPH represents more 
than 60% of the country’s population. The survey is a rotating panel that is conducted over the 
whole year and is published four times a year. Each selected household is interviewed in four 
waves of the survey. They are surveyed in two consecutive quarters, then not surveyed for two 
quarters, and then appear in the sample again for two consecutive quarters. I drop all duplicates 
from the data and concentrate my analysis on its cross-sectional aspect. 
Because the survey is already representative of urban areas, I do not restrict the sample based on 
the area of residence. Similar to the previous data, I restrict my sample to individuals aged 17-30 
in any of the survey years from 2004 to 2011. Note that Argentina did not have compulsory 
military service during this period. It had abolished conscription in 1995. Similar to the previous 
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two samples, I also drop those who were enrolled in school or who have any college degree from 
the sample. This makes the sample size 100,362 over eight survey years. Table A3 in the 
Appendix presents the sample statistics, separately for women and men.   
Economically Active Population Survey of Spain 
Spain abolished CMS at the end of 2001. Young men who finished schooling at early ages 
expected compulsory conscription at the age of 19 before 2001, and they did not worry about 
such an interruption after 2001. This natural experiment provides an opportunity to investigate 
the effect of compulsory conscription on early labor market outcomes. As such, I conduct a 
similar analysis as with the cross-country data using the Economically Active Population Survey, 
Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA), from Spain, conducted by the National Statistics Institute. 
This is a rotating quarterly survey administered to approximately 60,000 households each 
quarter. The rotation implies that each household remains in the sample for six consecutive 
quarters. The survey is continuously carried out each week during a quarter. The reference period 
for most questions in the survey is the week before the interview. The survey contains a variety 
of questions about demographic, social and economic characteristics of non-institutional 
individuals.12 
For my empirical analysis, I am not interested in the panel structure of the survey. Instead, I 
generate a repeated cross-section sample from survey years 1999-2004 using the first wave of 
each year.13 The dataset provides age in ranges. I restrict my sample to the age groups 16-19, 20-
                                                          
12 The survey excludes the population in institutional dwellings such as hospitals, hotels, barracks and prisons. 
According to National Statistics Institute documentation, this group constitutes 0.6 percent of the total population in 
2001 Census. 
13 Technically, I should be able to track individuals across years and drop those who appear more than once. Yet I 
have noticed problems when I use household and person identifiers to track individuals. Therefore, I picked the first 
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24, and 25-29. The fact that age is given in categories does not prevent analysis as the first age 
group is exactly the treatment group, and the rest is my control group.14 The age group 16-19 
expected conscription before 2001, and they did not worry about it after 2001. In order to restrict 
my empirical analysis to those who finished schooling at early ages, I dropped those who 
continued schooling after the age of 16, or who were enrolled when surveyed. Since conscription 
primarily affects citizens, I also dropped non-citizens from the sample. This leaves me with 
62,717 observations from the survey years 1999-2004. Table A4 in the Appendix provides 
sample statistics for main variables of interest. 
Tables A1-A3 provide a comparison of the final samples from the three countries. The average 
ages among women and men across the three samples are quite similar, given my sample 
selection criteria. In my final samples of non-college graduate individuals, the high school 
completion rate among men is 41% in Turkey, 66% in Peru, and 38% in Argentina. Similarly, 
32% of men In Turkey, 11% of men in Peru, and 29% of men in Argentina have an elementary 
school degree or less. The overall labor force participation is quite similar at 84% in Turkey, 
86% in Peru, and 89% in Argentina among men aged 17-30. The employment rate is lower in the 
sample from Turkey compared to the samples from Peru and Argentina. 
6. Empirical Analysis and Results   
In this section I describe my empirical framework and present evidence that compulsory military 
service reduces young men’s labor force participation even before they are called up for service. 
I start by pointing out the low labor force participation of teenage men in Turkey who finished 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
wave of each year to minimize the repetition of the same observations. Even when I use the data from all waves of 
the survey, the estimated effects are very similar.  
14 Although the conscription age is 19, I cannot reject that a fraction of the second group (20-24) might be affected 
by the abolition of CMS. This should not be a big fraction as my sample consists of men who left schooling before 
the age of 16. 
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schooling at an early age compared to similar men in their twenties with the same level of 
education. One explanation for the sharp increase in labor force participation around age 20 may 
be unobserved age-specific characteristics that are not related to compulsory conscription. To 
test this possibility, I incorporate micro-data from two other middle-income countries, Peru and 
Argentina. Graphically, I show that although the labor force participation trends are quite similar 
in the three countries among men in their twenties, labor force participation is significantly lower 
in Turkey among teenage men. Then, I present regression results that show significant 
differences in the age profile of labor force participation in Turkey, compared to both Peru and 
Argentina. I also show that a difference-in-differences strategy that uses women as control group 
would provide misleading results on the ex-ante labor market effects of CMS. This is because the 
assumption of common trends between men and women is clearly violated. 
Finally, I present within-country evidence from Spain which abolished the CMS in 2001. I use 
difference-in-differences (DD) estimation, with men in their twenties as a control group, and 
show that the abolition of CMS increased the labor force participation and employment of men 
in their late teens in Spain. I also find that the increase in labor force participation of teenage 
men after the abolition indirectly affected labor force participation and employment of teenage 
women in the reverse. Evidence on the substitutability of workers in response to compulsory 
conscription has also been neglected in the literature. 
6.1. The Labor Force Participation among Teenage Men in Turkey 
Figure 1a separately illustrates the labor force participation rates of young men and women with 
a high school degree or less using the Household Labor Force Survey micro-data from Turkey 
covering 2004-2011. The sample contains individuals from urban areas who are not enrolled in 
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school and who do not have a college degree. Although labor force participation ratio trends 
upward for men, it jumps after the age of twenty. It is around 60% before the age of 20 for men 
with 11 or fewer years of schooling, and it rises to 88% by the age of 22. For women, it is as low 
as 25% before and after age 20 and smooth throughout these ages. I narrow down my sample to 
those with a middle school degree or less education in Figure 1b, and to those with only an 
elementary school degree in Figure 1c. In all three figures, labor force participation of men 
jumps as they move from their teens to twenties in Turkey. When we investigate the employment 
likelihood in the sample, we observe similar patterns in Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c. The employment 
rate is around 55% before the age of 20 for men with 11 or fewer years of schooling, and it rises 
to 70% by the age of 22.  
Other reasons besides CMS are unlikely to explain the observed jump. Labor laws in Turkey do 
not prevent teenage men from working at the age of 17-20. Certain heavy industries are not 
allowed to employ individuals below age 18, but this is only a small share of the total employers, 
and this restriction would not directly affect individuals’ decision regarding labor force 
participation. While labor demand for very young individuals may be low, it does not explain 
why there would be a sudden jump for men but not for women at any particular age. Compulsory 
military service is a major policy that affects men aged 20-21. As the theoretical framework 
suggests, the compulsory conscription may be discouraging young men from searching for job 
before and around the conscription age. 
In addition, Figures 1a-2c illustrate that the labor force participation and employment trends are 
quite different between men and women. Overall, men have rising labor force participation 
across ages, whereas it is relatively stable for women across ages. This shows that assuming 
common trends between men and women and using women as a control group is misleading in 
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the analysis of military conscription. As will be explained later, instead of using women as a 
control group, I use men from other ages as a control group in my difference-in-differences 
analysis of military conscription in Spain. 
6.2. Cross-Country Evidence on the Effect of CMS: Turkey, Peru and Argentina 
Graphical Evidence 
One explanation for the sharp increase in labor force participation around age 20 may be 
unobserved age-specific characteristics that are not related to compulsory conscription. If we 
observe similar patterns of labor force participation among men in countries without compulsory 
military service then it would be difficult to attribute low labor force participation in Turkey to 
compulsory military service. In other words, the theory suggests that, everything else constant, 
we should observe low labor force participation among teenage men in countries with CMS than 
in countries without CMS. In order to examine this, I incorporate micro-data from Peru and 
Argentina. Although no two countries are the same, these three countries are middle income 
countries. Yet, the latter two abolished CMS in 1999 and 1995 respectively. As explained in the 
Section 5, the sample from each country covers the survey years 2004-2011, excludes the rural 
population, those who have any college degree, and those who were enrolled in school at the 
time of the survey. I compare elementary school graduates in Turkey to primary school graduates 
in Peru and Argentina, middle school graduates to secondary school dropouts in Peru and 
Argentina, and high school graduates in Turkey to secondary school graduates in Peru and 
Argentina. 
Figure 3a illustrates the labor force participation ratio of men with a high school degree at most 
across ages using ENAHO micro-data from Peru and HİA micro-data from Turkey. Square data 
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points represent the mean labor force participation rate in Turkey, and diamond data point 
represent that in Peru. Men from Turkey and Peru with no college degree have extremely similar 
labor force participation rates in their twenties. After ages 20-21, the data points are nearly 
identical. Yet before ages 20-21, labor force participation is considerably lower in Turkey. When 
I examine the trends among men with a middle school degree at most in Figure 3b, or among 
men with an elementary school degree in Figure 3c, I find the same patterns. In both figures, 
labor force participation is noticeably lower in Turkey among teenage men. The gap is more 
evident at ages 19 and 20, just below the conscription ages. For example, Figure 3b shows that, 
among men with a middle school degree or less at the age of 19, the labor force participation rate 
is 80% in Turkey versus 86% in Peru, while it is almost identical at the age of 22. The same 
pattern applies to employment status of men in the two countries. Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c show 
that men younger than 20 have a lower likelihood of employment in Turkey than in Peru, by 
around 20 percentage points. The employment rate increases substantially in Turkey over ages 
21 to 23 and comes much closer at those ages to the rate in Peru, although it remains a few points 
lower until age 28 or so. 
These figures reject the idea that very low labor force participation among teenage men in 
Turkey is due to unobserved characteristics common across countries. Although the labor force 
participation and employment trends are extremely similar in both countries among men in their 
twenties, they are significantly lower in Turkey among teenage men. This supports the 
theoretical prediction that compulsory conscription has ex-ante labor market effects on 
individuals before they are actually called for service.  
Next, I use micro data from Argentina in a similar fashion to Peru. Note that in the comparison 
between Turkey and Peru, I can restrict both samples to urban areas. I restricted the Turkish 
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sample to urban areas with more than 20,000 inhabitants, and the Peruvian sample to areas with 
more than 4,000 households, which is very close to 20,000 inhabitants on average. The EPH 
micro-data from Argentina covers only urban areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants, so the 
Argentinean sample may differ from the Turkish sample more than the Peruvian one. Still, 
graphical evidence from the comparison of samples from Turkey and Argentina support my 
hypothesis.  
Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c illustrate the labor force participation rate of men across ages using EPH 
micro-data from Argentina and HIA micro-data from Turkey. Again, the labor force participation 
trends are nearly identical in both countries for men older than 20-21. Yet Figure 5a shows that 
labor force participation among men younger than 20 is lower in Turkey by about 10 percentage 
points, compared to Argentina. The same pattern applies to employment status of men in two 
countries. Men older than 20-21 have very similar patterns of employment in both countries; 
men in the Turkish sample consistently have lower employment likelihood than men in the 
Argentinean sample by 2-3 points. Yet Figure 6a shows that men at the age of 19 have 9 
percentage points lower likelihood of employment in Turkey than in Argentina. 
It is worth noting that in Figures 5b and 6b, in the sample with a middle school degree or less 
education, 17 and 18 year-old men in Turkey have higher labor force participation rate and 
higher likelihood of employment than 17 and 18 year-old men in Argentina. For the ages 19-20, 
however, this is reversed, and men in Turkey have lower labor force participation and lower 
likelihood of employment. This supports the idea that the effect of expected conscription is 
concentrated around the conscription ages. 
Regression Analysis 
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The previous sub-section presented highly convincing graphical evidence that the labor force 
participation profile of young men in Turkey, which has compulsory military service, is 
significantly different from those in Peru and Argentina. Teenage men in Turkey have lower 
labor force participation and employment likelihood than their counterparts in Peru and 
Argentina. Now I will carry out a simple regression analysis to show the above-mentioned 
difference analytically. 
Similar to the graphical analysis, I use data of individuals aged 17-30 from survey years 2004-
2011 for each country separately. Then I exclude those who are from rural areas, those who are 
enrolled in school, and those who have any college degree. Next, I generate three samples from 
each country: high school degree at most, middle school degree at most, elementary/primary 
school degree at most. In total I have nine subsamples. Then, in each sample I estimate the 
following regression equation 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟_20𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +
2011
𝑡=2005
𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the labor force participation status or employment status of individual 𝑖, at age 𝑗, in 
survey year 𝑡, and 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟_20𝑗𝑡 is a binary indicator that takes the value 0 for individuals older 
than 20 and 1 for those who are 20 or younger. The survey year effects control for time specific 
characteristics such as labor market conditions that are constant across ages. The regression 
equation controls for quadratic age trends in labor force participation or employment likelihood. 
Considering the potential group structure of the error terms, in all specifications I allow standard 
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errors to be correlated within the same survey year.15 My strategy identifies whether and how 
much the younger individuals differ from the overall labor force participation or employment 
trend. 
Table 3 reports the estimated effects of being below the conscription age in nine subsamples 
from three countries. 20 year-old individuals who left schooling at earlier ages in Turkey and 
show up in the survey and therefore have not been conscripted are likely to be waiting for the 
conscription.16 Therefore they are part of the treated group. Yet there is a small possibility that 
they are exempt from military service due to other unobserved characteristics that make their 
labor supply different. To eliminate this concern, I try dropping men at ages 20-21 from the 
samples at the expense of losing some of the treatment group. In each panel, the first three 
columns present the estimated effects from the regression for men aged 17-30, and the second 
three columns exclude men aged 20-21. In all subsamples from Turkey, being younger than 20 is 
correlated with a significant decrease in labor force participation after controlling for quadratic 
age trends. However, for the other two countries without CMS, being younger than 20 is not 
correlated with a decrease in labor force participation. For example, the first column shows that 
among the sample of individuals without any college degree, being younger than 20 in Turkey is 
correlated with a 19 percentage point decrease in the labor force participation likelihood 
compared to those in their twenties. However, the estimated effect is either positive or 
statistically insignificant in Peru and Argentina. In columns 4-6 that exclude men aged 20-21, the 
estimates for Turkey are still negative and statistically significant whereas the estimates for Peru 
and Argentina are either positive or statistically insignificant. 
                                                          
15 Clustering at the age-group level provides smaller standard errors. I picked the approach with larger standard 
errors.  
16 Recall that all three surveys cover the non-institutional population. Yet, someone who turned 20 and shows up in 
the survey may be waiting to be conscripted as the actual conscription happens in one of four periods during the year 
that an individual turns 20. 
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The regressions verify the findings of the graphical analysis. Turkey has significantly lower labor 
force participation than the other two countries among teenage men compared to men in their 
twenties. In a cross-country analysis, one cannot expect the estimates from two countries to be 
the same. Yet, in the current case, the magnitude of the estimated effect of being younger than 20 
in Turkey is many times bigger than the estimated effect in Peru and Argentina. The estimated 
effect in Turkey is large and statistically significant, whereas it is concentrated around zero in 
Peru and Argentina. Table 4 repeats the same exercise for the effect on employment likelihood. 
Again, I find a significant negative effect for the indicator for being younger than 20 in Turkey, 
and insignificant effects in the samples from Peru and Argentina.17 
In addition, I combine the samples from pairs of countries together and estimate the following 
regression equation separately for each pair 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑐 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑀𝑆𝑐 + 𝛼4𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗
+ 𝛼5𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑀𝑆𝑐 + ∑ 𝛼𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
2011
𝑡=2005
+ ?⃗?𝑡𝑐
′ 𝜗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑐 . 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑐 is the labor market outcome of individual 𝑖, in age group 𝑗, in survey year 𝑡, in 
country 𝑐. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑀𝑆𝑐 is an indicator that takes the value one if the individual is from 
the Turkish sample, zero otherwise. ?⃗?𝑡𝑐
′  is a vector of country-year specific controls such as GDP 
per capita, overall labor force participation, male labor force participation, overall unemployment 
and male unemployment rate. We are interested in the interaction of the indicator for being a 
teenager with the indicator for being in a country with CMS, Turkey. Panel 1 of Table 5 
illustrates that labor force participation among men younger than 20 is lower in Turkey by about 
                                                          
17 Note that the magnitude of the estimated effect for Peru is significantly larger than the magnitude for Turkey in 
the sixth column of Table 4 only, for the sample with an elementary school degree at most.  
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13 percentage points, compared to Peru. The magnitude is smaller among men with a middle 
school degree or less, and slightly larger among men with an elementary school degree or less. 
Panel 2 illustrates that labor force participation among men younger than 20 is lower in Turkey 
compared to Argentina in the sample with a high school degree or less (by 12 percentage points), 
and the sample with elementary school or less (by 6.3 percentage points). Yet, teenage men in 
Turkey with middle school degree or less have slightly higher labor force participation (by 3 
percentage points) compared to Argentina. When I drop men aged 20-21 from the sample in the 
last three columns, because some of them may not be awaiting conscription and may be different 
on unobserved grounds, I still find that labor force participation among teenage men in Turkey is 
significantly lower than among those in Peru and Argentina. Table 6 repeats the exercise for the 
effect on employment.18 Panel 1 of Table 6 shows that the employment likelihood among 
teenage men in Turkey is significantly lower than among those in Peru. Panel 2 provides rather 
insignificant estimates for the effect on the employment likelihood.19  
Although the cross-country evidence presented above is clear and intuitive, one can still have 
questions regarding the identification of the effect of CMS. Since no two countries are exactly 
the same, individuals may be concerned about two countries having different labor market 
structures or social characteristics for teenage men. Also, the definitions of labor force 
participation, employment, and schooling levels slightly differ across countries. To deal with 
these concerns, I generated similar employment and schooling categories across countries as 
explained in Section 5. Also, having very similar trends across ages after the conscription age in 
                                                          
18 One may be concerned that the recent recession affects teenagers differently across countries. Table A7 and A8 in 
the Appendix restrict the sample period to years before the great recession, 2004-2007. The findings are similar.  
19 In particular, the estimates in the second and fifth columns of Panel 2 in Table 6 are counterintuitive. Those two 
columns correspond to the sample of Figures 6b that I mentioned at the beginning of Section 6.2.  
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all three counties and controlling for country-year specific characteristics ameliorates the 
aforementioned concerns. 
6.3. The Ex-Ante Labor Market Effects of the Abolition of Conscription in Spain 
In this section, I investigate the impact of abolishing CMS in Spain using the Encuesta de 
Poblacion Active (EPA) 1999-2004 in a difference-in-differences framework. The previous 
figures showed that assuming common labor force participation trends between men and women 
is misleading. Paloyo (2010) investigates the effect of conscription in Germany on future 
earnings in a DD framework using women as a control group. Yet he assumes common trends 
between men and women across cohorts rather than ages, which lessens the concerns that arose 
when I compared men and women in Turkey. Consequently, I use men in their twenties as a 
control group and show that the abolition of CMS in 2001 actually increased the labor force 
participation and employment of teenage men in Spain. Moreover, the employment rate of 
teenage men conditional on being in the labor force also improved. Lastly, I find that abolishing 
CMS adversely affected labor market opportunities of teenage women. 
As mentioned in Section 3, there were a number of groups that could defer or get an exemption 
from service. Exemptions and deferments were particularly common in the years directly 
preceding the abolition of CMS. Since deferments and exemptions are closely related to 
education, I restrict my sample to individuals who finished schooling at the age of sixteen, a 
relatively young age. Thus, they would not be deferring compulsory military service due to 
enrollment in college. Although alternative public service is the same as military conscription in 
terms of the duration of interruption, individuals who left schooling at an early age are less likely 
36 
 
to be conscientious objectors, and in any case conscientious objectors face the same labor market 
interruption. 
Figures 7a, 7b, and 7c illustrate labor force participation among Spanish men across years 
separately for three age groups: 16-19, 20-24, and 25-29. In all three figures, the labor force 
participation rate among teenage men jumps as they move from the pre-2001 period to post-2001 
period, while it is stable among men in their twenties. It is around 88% before 2001 for teenage 
men with 10 or fewer years of schooling, and it rises to 94% after the abolition of CMS in 2001. 
For men aged 20-24 it barely moves from 96% to 97% and for men aged 25-29 it stays at 96%.  
When we examine the employment likelihood in the sample, we observe similar patterns in 
Figures 8a, 8b, and 8c. The average employment rate is 59% among teenage men with 10 or 
fewer years of schooling before 2001, and it rises to 68% after the abolition of CMS. The change 
among men in their twenties is as small as 2 percentage points. Figures 9a, 9b, and 9c illustrate 
that employment rate conditional on labor force participation among teenage men also increases 
after 2001, whereas it is mostly stable for men in their twenties before and after 2001. Table A5 
in the Appendix presents the average values for these characteristics before and after the 
abolition of CMS separately for age groups and education levels. Next, I will estimate the impact 
of the abolition of CMS in a DD framework. 
Because I investigate the effect of the existence of CMS on ex-ante labor market outcomes, the 
estimated effects should be interpreted as Intent-to-Treat estimates. Note that the Intent-to-Treat 
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estimates will be smaller than Average Treatment Effect estimates unless everyone in the 
country actually expects to serve in the military when they turn 19.20  
The estimation strategy compares the labor market outcomes of teenage men at the same age 
before and after the abolition of CMS in December 2001. In order to control for any unobserved 
change in the overall labor market characteristics over this period, I use men in their twenties as 
the control group. So, my identification strategy identifies the effect of the abolition of 
conscription by comparing relative differences in labor market outcomes across age groups 
before and after abolition affected the younger age group. This identification strategy relies on 
the common trends assumption in the absence of any policy change; I assume that the trends 
among teenage men and trends among men in their twenties would be similar if there were no 
change in CMS laws. Note that this does not necessitate that the levels of labor market outcomes 
be similar across age groups, but rather that the level within each age group changes in a similar 
fashion across years. 
I estimate the following regression equations   
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗
2
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝜓𝑗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
2
𝑗=1
+ 𝛿2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ ∑ 𝜔𝑘𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘
𝑘=18
𝑘=2
+ ?⃗?𝑡
′𝜗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
                                                          
20 Note that unlike the previous literature, the treatment in my paper is not serving in the armed forces. The 
treatment is the expectation of military service, regardless of whether an individual actually serves or not. So the 
ITT Effect equals the ATT when everyone expects the conscription. 
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𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛾3𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ ∑ 𝜔𝑘𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘
𝑘=18
𝑘=2
+ ?⃗?𝑡
′𝜗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
The dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the labor market outcome of individual 𝑖, in age group 𝑗, in survey 
year 𝑡, and 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 is a binary indicator that takes the value 0 for observations from survey 
years 1999, 2000, 2001 and 1 for observations from 2002, 2003, 2004. 𝛿2 captures the linear year 
trend, and 𝜔𝑘 captures the fixed effects for eighteen autonomous communities in Spain. ?⃗?𝑡
′ is a 
vector of year specific controls such as GDP per capita, labor force participation, and 
unemployment rate. There are three age groups in the first regression model: 16-19, 20-24, 25-
29, and two age groups in the second model: teenager (16-19) and non-teenager (20-29); recall 
that single ages are not revealed in the Spanish data. The theoretical model predicts that those 
who are under the conscription age (16-19) will be particularly affected by its abolition. The 
estimated value of 𝜓1 in the first model captures the effect of the abolition of conscription on 
teenage men compared to men aged 25-29, and 𝛾3 in the second model captures the effect of the 
abolition of conscription on teenage men compared to men in their twenties. 
The following tables present the estimated effects of the abolition of compulsory military service 
in Spain on ex-ante outcomes such as labor force participation, employment status and 
employment likelihood conditional on being in the labor force. In Tables 7-9, the first panel 
shows the coefficient estimates from the first regression equation and treats the age group 25-29 
as the default category. The second panel shows the coefficient estimates from the second 
regression equation and treats non-teenagers as the default category. Similar to the previous 
regressions, I generate three sub-samples according to education levels. The three columns in 
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each table investigate the inclusive samples with 10 years of schooling or less, 8 years of 
schooling or less, and 6 years of schooling or less, respectively. 
Panel 1 in Table 7 shows that among men with ten years of schooling or less, those aged 16-19 
are 5.9 percentage points (6.7%) more likely to be in the labor force after the abolition of 
conscription compared to men aged 25-29. The estimated effect is similar among men with 8 
years of schooling or less, and greater among men with 6 years of schooling or less, at 19.7 
percentage points (30%). These estimated coefficients are statistically and economically 
significant. Panel 2 results, which combine both older groups together into a single control 
group, are very similar, verifying that the results are not driven by strange behavior of one of 
them.  
Table 8 shows the estimated effect of the abolition of CMS on employment status of young men. 
As expected, the estimates are positive and statistically and economically significant across the 
six specifications. Panel 1 shows that men aged 16-19 are 6.9 percentage points (11%) more 
likely to be employed after the abolition of conscription compared to men aged 25-29. Again, the 
estimated effect in the second sample is similar, and the effect in the sample with 6 years of 
schooling or less is much greater, at 17 percentage points (40%). Panel 2 results are very similar 
to those in Panel 1. 
A deeper look at the results shows that the gain in employment of teenage men after the abolition 
of CMS is greater in magnitude than the gain in labor force participation. Labor force 
participation can be considered a unilateral decision by individuals themselves, whereas 
employment depends on hiring decisions of employers. The results suggest that the abolition of 
conscription also affected the hiring behavior of employers. As I explained in the theoretical 
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model in Section 4.3, employers may be more likely to hire teenage men when they do not worry 
about an expected interruption. The only exception to this observation is the sample with 6 years 
of schooling or less. The effect on the employment for this group is slightly smaller than the 
effect on labor force participation. 
Table 9 confirms these observations by focusing on employment conditional on labor force 
participation. Although the estimates are statistically insignificant, they are consistently positive 
across the six sample specifications. Panel 1 in Table 9 suggests that a teenage man who is 
actively searching for a job is 3 percentage points (4.5%) more likely to be hired by an employer 
after the abolition of CMS compared to men aged 25-29. 
6.4. The Effect of Abolition of Conscription on Teenage Women 
The theoretical model implies that men who expect an interruption in their labor market 
experience reduce their search effort, and employers who expect their teenage employees to be 
conscripted reduce their hiring of teenage workers. The previous sub-section provided novel 
empirical evidence on the ex-ante labor market effects of CMS in Spain. Next, I will point out 
another interesting consequence. Since teenage women may be close substitute for teenage men 
in the labor market, teenage women may benefit from CMS because it reduces the labor supply 
of teenage men. Theoretically, we can even expect effects on women of other ages, but the 
substitutability between 16-19 year-old men and 16-19 year-old women should be higher than 
the substitutability between 16-19 men and 25-29 women. Below, I estimate the previous two 
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regression equations for the sample of women in a similar fashion to men and present the 
estimates in Tables 10-12.21 
Panel 1 in Table 10 shows that, among the sample with ten years of schooling or less, women 
aged 16-19 are 6.5 percentage points (7.5%) less likely to be in the labor force after the abolition 
of conscription compared to women aged 25-29. The estimated effect is similar and statistically 
significant among women with 8 years of schooling as well. It is negative but loses statistical 
significance among women with 6 years of schooling or less. There are also smaller negative 
effects for women aged 20-24, who may also be substitutes in the labor market for men aged 16-
19. The estimated coefficient for the effect on teenage women’s labor force participation is 
consistently negative in all of the specifications. Panel 2 results are very similar to those in Panel 
1. Notably, these results are similar in magnitude, while opposite in sign, for teenage men. 
I present the estimated effect of the abolition of CMS on employment of young women in Table 
11. As expected, the estimates are consistently negative across six specifications and statistically 
significant in four of them. Panel 2 results are very similar to those in Panel 1. Table 12 presents 
the estimated effect on the employment rate of teenage women conditional on being in the labor 
force. The estimates are statistically insignificant, yet consistently negative. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigate an effect of compulsory military service that has not received attention 
in the literature. I examine the effect of peace-time conscription on early labor market outcomes 
of potential conscripts before they are called up for service. Many papers in the literature 
estimate the post-service labor market effects of compulsory conscription, with some finding 
                                                          
21 Tables 7-9 and tables 10-12 have the same regression equations except that the second group investigates the 
sample of women.  
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negative effects and some finding no effect on later wages. In a simple theoretical model with 
costly job search and no job security, I show that an expected interruption in civilian life reduces 
the incentive of teenagers to search for a job. Moreover, when the firms bear the cost of on-the-
job training, such an expected interruption may reduce employers’ likelihood of offering a job to 
expected future conscripts. 
Using labor force micro-data from four countries including Turkey, Peru, Argentina and Spain, I 
make the following contributions to the compulsory military service literature. First, I highlight 
the anticipation effects of CMS. By showing the ex-ante effects of CMS, I point out one cause of 
low labor force participation among youth in countries with CMS, a common concern around the 
world. Second, I show one channel through which conscription may affect future labor market 
outcomes of individuals. Adverse effects of CMS on the teenage labor market experience may 
partially explain why the previous literature finds either negative or no effect of conscription, 
rather than positive effects that some have hypothesized. Third, idleness and poor labor market 
experience among teenage men caused by expected conscription may explain why the previous 
studies find a correlation between conscription and later criminal activity. Finally, I point out that 
CMS affects not only teenage men, but also indirectly affects teenage women. The effect of 
conscription on labor market outcomes of teenage women has not apparently been investigated 
in the literature. This also contributes to the literature on substitutability in the labor market 
showing that teenage men and women are highly substitutable. 
Using micro-data from Turkey, Peru and Argentina, I show that, although labor force 
participation and employment trends are very similar in all three countries among men in their 
twenties, they are significantly lower in Turkey (which has CMS) among teenage men compared 
to Peru and Argentina (which do not). Also, using the Active Population Survey from Spain, 
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before and after Spain abolished conscription in 2001, I present within country difference-in-
differences evidence that the abolition of CMS increased the labor force participation and 
employment likelihood of teenage men while decreasing the labor force market opportunities of 
teenage women.   
Thus, unlike the future labor market outcomes of CMS, ex-ante labor market effects are 
consistently negative and statistically significant across specifications and sample selections. 
While the decision to switch from a conscription army to a professional one is partly strategic 
and partly economic, I point out an effect on labor market opportunities of youth.  
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Table 3 - The Effect of Being Younger than Twenty on Labor Force Participation of Men 
        
 
Men Aged 17-30 
 
Men Aged 17-19 & 22-30 
        
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
The Sample from Turkey 
        Younger than 20 -0.195*** -0.116*** -0.105*** 
 
-0.235*** -0.086*** -0.080*** 
 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.014) 
 
(0.023) (0.008) (0.018) 
        Number of Obs. 189,150 110,117 61,470 
 
173,149 102,400 58,327 
        The Sample from Peru 
        Younger than 20 0.045** 0.014 -0.036 
 
0.052** -0.013 -0.132 
 
(0.015) (0.030) (0.044) 
 
(0.020) (0.042) (0.094) 
        Number of Obs. 18,204 6,140 2,016 
 
15,395 5,284 1,765 
        The Sample from Argentina 
        Younger than 20 0.002 0.040** 0.026 
 
-0.002 0.065** 0.056* 
 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.022) 
 
(0.015) (0.025) (0.024) 
        Number of Obs. 47,558 29,256 13,903 
 
40,601 24,917 12,149 
        Note: Each cell shows the estimated coefficient for the indicator of being 20 years old or younger. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes one if individual is in the labor force. The educational categories correspond to 11 years or less, 8-9 
years or less, and 5-6 years or less, respectively. Each of the nine sub-samples excludes women, rural population, those who were 
enrolled in school when surveyed. All estimations control for survey year fixed effects and quadratic age trends. The first three 
columns contain men aged 17-30, and the last three columns drop men at the age of 20 or 21 from the samples. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the survey year level. 
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Table 4 - The Effect of Being Younger than Twenty on Employment Likelihood of Men 
        
 
Men Aged 17-30 
 
Men Aged 17-19 & 22-30 
        
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
The Sample from Turkey 
        Younger than 20 -0.085*** -0.009 -0.031* 
 
-0.119*** 0.004 -0.030 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015) 
 
(0.021) (0.011) (0.028) 
        Number of Obs. 189,150 110,117 61,470 
 
173,149 102,400 58,327 
        The Sample from Peru 
        Younger than 20 0.019 0.004 -0.066 
 
0.006 -0.035 -0.179* 
 
(0.016) (0.031) (0.056) 
 
(0.023) (0.052) (0.086) 
        Number of Obs. 18,204 6,140 2,016 
 
15,395 5,284 1,765 
        The Sample from Argentina 
        Younger than 20 -0.024 -0.005 -0.004 
 
-0.067** -0.018 -0.002 
 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.022) 
 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.025) 
        Number of Obs. 47,558 29,256 13,903 
 
40,601 24,917 12,149 
        Note: Each cell shows the estimated coefficient for the indicator of being 20 years old or younger. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes one if individual is employed. The educational categories correspond to 11 years or less, 8-9 years or 
less and 5-6 years or less respectively. Each of the nine sub-samples excludes women, rural population, those who were enrolled 
in school when surveyed. All estimations control for survey year fixed effects and quadratic age trends. The first three columns 
contain men aged 17-30, and the last three columns drop men at the age of 20 or 21 from the samples. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses, clustered at the survey year level. 
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Table 5 - The Effect of CMS on Labor Force Participation of Teenage Men - Pooled Sample 
        
 
Men Aged 17-30
 
Men Aged 17-19 & 22-30 
        
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
        Panel 1 - Turkey vs. Peru (Peru is the default country) 
        Younger than 20*Turkey -0.130*** -0.063*** -0.144*** 
 
-0.106*** -0.037** -0.131*** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.019) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.024) 
Younger than 20 -0.050** -0.048*** 0.034 
 
-0.110*** -0.047*** 0.042 
 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.022) 
 
(0.029) (0.011) (0.028) 
Turkey -0.008 0.048** 0.061 
 
0.025 0.121*** 0.157 
 
(0.015) (0.019) (0.104) 
 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.109) 
        Number of Obs. 207,354 116,257 63,486 
 
188,544 107,684 60,092 
        Panel 2 - Turkey vs. Argentina (Argentina is the default country) 
        Younger than 20*Turkey -0.119*** 0.030*** -0.063*** 
 
-0.090*** 0.079*** -0.025 
 
(0.017) (0.009) (0.015) 
 
(0.024) (0.014) (0.014) 
Younger than 20 -0.058** -0.094*** -0.022 
 
-0.119** -0.117*** -0.029 
 
(0.020) (0.008) (0.017) 
 
(0.034) (0.012) (0.018) 
Turkey -0.004 0.018 -0.177** 
 
-0.124 -0.069 -0.252*** 
 
(0.042) (0.047) (0.061) 
 
(0.069) (0.056) (0.071) 
        Number of Obs. 236,708 139,373 75,373 
 
213,750 127,317 70,476 
        Note: Each column presents results from a separate Linear Probability Model regression. The dependent variable is an indicator for 
being in the labor force. The regression model compares the teenage labor force participation in Turkey vs. Peru in Panel 1, and in 
Turkey vs. Argentina in Panel 2. The ages are grouped into two categories; men younger than 20, and men older than 21. Men older 
than 21 is the default category.  The variable of interest is theYounger than 20*Turkey. The sample in the separate columns contain 
individuals with HS degree or less, MS degree or less, and ES degree or less, respectively. Each sample excludes women, rural 
population, and those who were enrolled in school when surveyed. All estimations control for survey year fixed effects and 
quadratic age trends. All estimations control for GDP per capita, overall labor force participation, male labor force participation, 
overall unemployment, and male unemployment rate of the countries. The first three columns contain men aged 17-30, and the last 
three columns drop men at the age of 20 or 21 from the samples. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the 
survey year level. 
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Table 6 - The Effect of CMS on Employment Likelihood of Teenage Men – Pooled Sample 
        
 
Men Aged 17-30
 
Men Aged 17-19 & 22-30 
        
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
        Panel 1 - Turkey vs. Peru (Peru is the default country) 
        Younger than 20*Turkey -0.044*** 0.007 -0.136*** 
 
-0.022* 0.027 -0.136*** 
 
(0.009) (0.018) (0.031) 
 
(0.009) (0.017) (0.033) 
Younger than 20 -0.033** -0.014 0.094** 
 
-0.086*** -0.023* 0.093** 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.030) 
 
(0.020) (0.011) (0.038) 
Turkey 0.066* 0.146** 0.118* 
 
0.105** 0.227*** 0.193* 
 
(0.030) (0.059) (0.055) 
 
(0.032) (0.056) (0.086) 
        Number of Obs. 207,354 116,257 63,486 
 
188,544 107,684 60,092 
        Panel 2 - Turkey vs. Argentina (Argentina is the default country) 
        Younger than 20*Turkey -0.022 0.103*** -0.004 
 
0.004 0.139*** 0.026 
 
(0.013) (0.007) (0.025) 
 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.027) 
Younger than 20 -0.055*** -0.082*** -0.020 
 
-0.113*** -0.111*** -0.043 
 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.019) 
 
(0.025) (0.011) (0.025) 
Turkey 0.277** 0.190** 0.101 
 
0.134 0.032 -0.036 
 
(0.086) (0.080) (0.102) 
 
(0.135) (0.101) (0.105) 
        Number of Obs. 236,708 139,373 75,373 
 
213,750 127,317 70,476 
        Note: Each column presents results from a separate Linear Probability Model regression. The dependent variable is an indicator for 
being employed. The regression model compares the teenage labor force participation in Turkey vs. Peru in Panel 1, and in Turkey 
vs. Argentina in Panel 2. The ages are grouped into two categories; men younger than 20, and men older than 21. Men older than 21 
is the default category.  The variable of interest is the Younger than 20*Turkey. The sample in the separate columns contain 
individuals with HS degree or less, MS degree or less, and ES degree or less, respectively. Each sample excludes women, rural 
population, and those who were enrolled in school when surveyed. All estimations control for survey year fixed effects and 
quadratic age trends. All estimations control for GDP per capita, overall labor force participation, male labor force participation, 
overall unemployment, and male unemployment rate of the countries. The first three columns contain men aged 17-30, and the last 
three columns drop men at the age of 20 or 21 from the samples. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the 
survey year level. 
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Table 7 - The Effect of Abolition of CMS on Labor Force Participation of Teenage Men in Spain 
       
  
10 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
8 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
6 Years of 
Schooling or Less 
    
       Panel 1 
       Age group 16-19*Abolition 
 
0.059** 
 
0.052*** 
 
0.197*** 
  
(0.015) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.017) 
Age group 20-24*Abolition 
 
0.007 
 
0.010 
 
0.067** 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.025) 
Age group 16-19 
 
-0.079*** 
 
-0.084*** 
 
-0.126*** 
  
(0.012) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.017) 
Age group 20-24 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.019 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.016) 
Abolition 
 
-0.001 
 
0.022*** 
 
0.275*** 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.008) 
       Number of Observations 
 
37,862 
 
22,818 
 
2,787 
       Panel 2 
       Teenager*Abolition 
 
0.055*** 
 
0.048*** 
 
0.167*** 
  
(0.012) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.019) 
Teenager 
 
-0.078*** 
 
-0.081*** 
 
-0.117*** 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.014) 
Abolition 
 
0.002 
 
0.026*** 
 
0.291*** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.010) 
       Number of Observations 
 
37,862 
 
22,818 
 
2,787 
       Note: Each column presents results from a separate Linear Probability Model regression. The dependent variable is an indicator 
for being in the labor force. Panel 1 groups the ages into three categories, 16-19, 20-24, 25-29. Age group 25-29 is the default 
category. The variable of interest is the Age group 16-19*Abolition. Panel 2 groups the ages into two categories; teenagers and 
non-teenagers. Non-teenagers are the default category.  The variable of interest is the Teenager*Abolition. The sample in the 
separate columns contain individuals with 10 years of schooling or less, 8 years of schooling or less, and 6 years of schooling or 
less, respectively. All estimations control for 18 survey area fixed effects and the survey year fixed effects. All estimations also 
control for GDP per capita, male labor force participation, and male unemployment rate of the countries. Robust standard errors 
are shown in the parentheses, clustered at the survey year level. 
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Table 8 - The Effect of Abolition of CMS on Employment Likelihood of Teenage Men in Spain 
       
  
10 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
8 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
6 Years of 
Schooling or Less 
    
       Panel 1 
       Age group 16-19*Abolition 
 
0.067* 
 
0.074* 
 
0.169*** 
  
(0.026) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.041) 
Age group 20-24*Abolition 
 
0.001 
 
-0.004 
 
0.068 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.034) 
Age group 16-19 
 
-0.226*** 
 
-0.221*** 
 
-0.196*** 
  
(0.025) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.024) 
Age group 20-24 
 
-0.041*** 
 
-0.038*** 
 
-0.061** 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.020) 
Abolition 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.036*** 
 
0.011 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.012) 
       Number of Observations 
 
37,862 
 
22,818 
 
2,787 
       Panel 2 
       Teenager*Abolition 
 
0.066** 
 
0.075* 
 
0.140** 
  
(0.023) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.043) 
Teenager 
 
-0.207*** 
 
-0.204*** 
 
-0.169*** 
  
(0.021) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.015) 
Abolition 
 
-0.011** 
 
-0.037*** 
 
0.038** 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.012) 
       Number of Observations 
 
37,862 
 
22,818 
 
2,787 
       Note: Each column presents results from a separate Linear Probability Model regression. The dependent variable is an indicator 
for being employed. Panel 1 groups the ages into three categories, 16-19, 20-24, 25-29. Age group 25-29 is the default category. 
The variable of interest is the Age group 16-19*Abolition. Panel 2 groups the ages into two categories; teenagers and non-
teenagers. Non-teenagers are the default category.  The variable of interest is the Teenager*Abolition. The sample in the separate 
columns contain individuals with 10 years of schooling or less, 8 years of schooling or less, and 6 years of schooling or less, 
respectively. All estimations control for 18 survey area fixed effects and the survey year fixed effects. All estimations also 
control for GDP per capita, male labor force participation, and male unemployment rate of the countries. Robust standard errors 
are shown in the parentheses, clustered at the survey year level. 
  
64 
 
Table 9 - The Effect of Abolition of CMS on Employment of Teenage Men In Spain 
Conditional on LF Participation 
       
  
10 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
8 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
6 Years of 
Schooling or Less 
           Panel 1 
       Age group 16-19*Abolition 
 
0.031 
 
0.044 
 
0.057 
  
(0.026) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.046) 
Age group 20-24*Abolition 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.013* 
 
0.025 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.029) 
Age group 16-19 
 
-0.181*** 
 
-0.172*** 
 
-0.158*** 
  
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.020) 
Age group 20-24 
 
-0.041*** 
 
-0.034*** 
 
-0.066** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.023) 
Abolition 
 
-0.019** 
 
-0.060*** 
 
-0.268*** 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.016) 
       Number of Observations 
 
36,162 
 
21,598 
 
2,162 
       Panel 2 
       Teenager*Abolition 
 
0.033 
 
0.049 
 
0.047 
  
(0.024) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.043) 
Teenager 
 
-0.161*** 
 
-0.156*** 
 
-0.130*** 
  
(0.019) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.016) 
Abolition 
 
-0.019*** 
 
-0.064*** 
 
-0.245*** 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.017) 
       Number of Observations 
 
36,162 
 
21,598 
 
2,162 
       Note: Each column presents results from a separate Linear Probability Model regression. The dependent variable is an indicator 
for being employed. Panel 1 groups the ages into three categories, 16-19, 20-24, 25-29. Age group 25-29 is the default category. 
The variable of interest is the Age group 16-19*Abolition. Panel 2 groups the ages into two categories; teenagers and non-
teenagers. Non-teenagers are the default category.  The variable of interest is the Teenager*Abolition. The sample in the separate 
columns contain individuals with 10 years of schooling or less, 8 years of schooling or less, and 6 years of schooling or less, 
respectively. All samples exclude those who are not in the labor force. All estimations control for 18 survey area fixed effects and 
the survey year. All estimations also control for GDP per capita, male labor force participation, and male unemployment rate of 
the countries. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses, clustered at the survey year level. 
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Table 10-The Effect of Abolition of CMS on Labor Force Participation of Teenage Women in Spain 
       
  
10 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
8 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
6 Years of 
Schooling or Less 
           Panel 1 
       Age group 16-19*Abolition 
 
-0.065*** 
 
-0.080** 
 
-0.047 
  
(0.016) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.036) 
Age group 20-24*Abolition 
 
-0.032*** 
 
-0.035*** 
 
-0.033 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.048) 
Age group 16-19 
 
0.112*** 
 
0.127*** 
 
0.120** 
  
(0.014) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.034) 
Age group 20-24 
 
0.131*** 
 
0.140*** 
 
0.111*** 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.023) 
Abolition 
 
-0.003 
 
0.016** 
 
-0.258*** 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.027) 
       Number of Observations 
 
24,855 
 
15,226 
 
1,920 
       Panel 2 
       Teenager*Abolition 
 
-0.051** 
 
-0.065** 
 
-0.032 
  
(0.015) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.028) 
Teenager 
 
0.056*** 
 
0.069*** 
 
0.075** 
  
(0.013) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.026) 
Abolition 
 
-0.012*** 
 
0.012*** 
 
-0.265*** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.013) 
       Number of Observations 
 
24,855 
 
15,226 
 
1,920 
       Note: Each column presents results from a separate Linear Probability Model regression for the sample of women. The dependent 
variable is an indicator for being in the labor force. Panel 1 groups the ages into three categories, 16-19, 20-24, 25-29. Age group 
25-29 is the default category. The variable of interest is the Age group 16-19*Abolition. Panel 2 groups the ages into two 
categories; teenagers and non-teenagers. Non-teenagers are the default category.  The variable of interest is the 
Teenager*Abolition. The sample in the separate columns contain individuals with 10 years of schooling or less, 8 years of 
schooling or less, and 6 years of schooling or less, respectively. All estimations control for 18 survey area fixed effects and the 
survey year fixed effects. All estimations also control for GDP per capita, female labor force participation, and female 
unemployment rate of the countries. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses, clustered at the survey year level. 
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Table 11 - The Effect of Abolition of CMS on Employment Likelihood of Teenage Women in Spain 
       
  
10 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
8 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
6 Years of 
Schooling or Less 
  
         Panel 1 
       Age group 16-19*Abolition 
 
-0.061** 
 
-0.068* 
 
-0.082 
  
(0.018) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.063) 
Age group 20-24*Abolition 
 
-0.028** 
 
-0.033* 
 
-0.074 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.059) 
Age group 16-19 
 
-0.034* 
 
0.006 
 
0.030 
  
(0.014) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.062) 
Age group 20-24 
 
0.089*** 
 
0.108*** 
 
0.084* 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.042) 
Abolition 
 
0.027*** 
 
0.028** 
 
-0.072* 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.029) 
       Number of Observations 
 
24,855 
 
15,226 
 
1,920 
       Panel 2 
       Teenager*Abolition 
 
-0.049** 
 
-0.054* 
 
-0.052 
  
(0.015) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.052) 
Teenager 
 
-0.073*** 
 
-0.039* 
 
-0.004 
  
(0.012) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.047) 
Abolition 
 
0.017*** 
 
0.022*** 
 
-0.100*** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.013) 
       Number of Observations 
 
24,855 
 
15,226 
 
1,920 
       Note: Each column presents results from a separate Linear Probability Model regression for the sample of women. The dependent 
variable is an indicator for being employed in Table 10. Panel 1 groups the ages into three categories, 16-19, 20-24, 25-29. Age 
group 25-29 is the default category. The variable of interest is the Age group 16-19*Abolition. Panel 2 groups the ages into two 
categories; teenagers and non-teenagers. Non-teenagers are the default category.  The variable of interest is the 
Teenager*Abolition. The sample in the separate columns contain individuals with 10 years of schooling or less, 8 years of 
schooling or less, and 6 years of schooling or less, respectively. All estimations control for 18 survey area fixed effects and the 
survey year fixed effects. All estimations also control for GDP per capita, female labor force participation, and female 
unemployment rate of the countries. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses, clustered at the survey year level. 
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Table 12 - The Effect of Abolition of CMS on Likelihood of Teenage Women in Spain 
Conditional on LF Participation 
       
  
10 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
8 Years of 
Schooling or Less  
6 Years of 
Schooling or Less 
    
       Panel 1 
       Age group 16-19*Abolition 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.097 
  
(0.020) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.102) 
Age group 20-24*Abolition 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.092 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.077) 
Age group 16-19 
 
-0.128*** 
 
-0.091** 
 
-0.068 
  
(0.014) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.099) 
Age group 20-24 
 
0.004 
 
0.021 
 
0.044 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.064) 
Abolition 
 
0.032*** 
 
0.020* 
 
0.138* 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.059) 
       Number of Observations 
 
20,264 
 
12,043 
 
1,088 
       Panel 2 
       Teenager*Abolition 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.057 
  
(0.016) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.078) 
Teenager 
 
-0.130*** 
 
-0.101*** 
 
-0.088 
  
(0.011) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.071) 
Abolition 
 
0.025*** 
 
0.012** 
 
0.101** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.032) 
       Number of Observations 
 
20,264 
 
12,043 
 
1,088 
       Note: Each column presents results from a separate Linear Probability Model regression for the sample of women. The dependent 
variable is an indicator for being employed. Panel 1 groups the ages into three categories, 16-19, 20-24, 25-29. Age group 25-29 
is the default category. The variable of interest is the Age group 16-19*Abolition. Panel 2 groups the ages into two categories; 
teenagers and non-teenagers. Non-teenagers are the default category.  The variable of interest is the Teenager*Abolition. The 
sample in the separate columns contain individuals with 10 years of schooling or less, 8 years of schooling or less, and 6 years of 
schooling or less, respectively. The sample in Table 11 excludes those who are not in the labor force. All estimations control for 
18 survey area fixed effects and the survey year fixed effects. All estimations also control for GDP per capita, female labor force 
participation, and female unemployment rate of the countries. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses, clustered at 
the survey year level. 
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Table A1 -  Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Individuals between 17 and 30 (Turkey) 
         
  
Women 
 
Men 
         
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
         Age 
 
23.966 
 
3.980 
 
24.122 
 
4.024 
         % Less than Middle School 
 
0.517 
 
0.500 
 
0.325 
 
0.468 
         % Middle School Only 
 
0.174 
 
0.379 
 
0.257 
 
0.437 
         % High School Only 
 
0.309 
 
0.462 
 
0.418 
 
0.493 
         % in Labor Force 
 
0.221 
 
0.415 
 
0.848 
 
0.359 
         % Employed 
 
0.167 
 
0.373 
 
0.707 
 
0.455 
         Number of Observations 
 
229873 
 
189150 
Note: The sample contains individuals aged 17-30 from all survey years 2004-2011. The sample excludes the rural population, 
those who were enrolled in school when surveyed, and those who have college degree. Degree attainments are defined in an 
exclusive way. 
 
Table A2 -  Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Individuals between 17 and 30 (Peru) 
         
  
Women   Men 
         
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
         Age 
 
23.114 
 
4.121 
 
22.914 
 
4.073 
         % Primary School or Less 
 
0.162 
 
0.368 
 
0.111 
 
0.314 
         % Secondary School Drop Out 0.214 
 
0.410 
 
0.227 
 
0.419 
         % Secondary School 
 
0.624 
 
0.484 
 
0.663 
 
0.473 
         % in Labor Force  
 
0.645 
 
0.478 
 
0.868 
 
0.339 
         % Employed 
 
0.498 
 
0.500 
 
0.754 
 
0.430 
         Number of Observations   18447   18204 
Note: The sample contains individuals aged 17-30 from all survey years 2004-2011. The sample excludes the rural population, 
those who were enrolled in school when surveyed, and those who have college degree. Degree attainments are defined in an 
exclusive way. 
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Table A3 -  Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Individuals between 17 and 30 (Argentina) 
         
  
Women   Men 
         
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
         Age 
 
24.030 
 
3.796 
 
24.089 
 
3.789 
         % Primary School or Less 
 
0.260 
 
0.439 
 
0.292 
 
0.455 
         % Secondary School Drop Out 0.305 
 
0.460 
 
0.323 
 
0.468 
         % Secondary School 
 
0.435 
 
0.496 
 
0.385 
 
0.487 
         % in Labor Force  
 
0.538 
 
0.499 
 
0.892 
 
0.311 
         % Employed 
 
0.431 
 
0.495 
 
0.780 
 
0.414 
         Number of Observations   41611   47588 
Note: The sample contains individuals aged 17-30 from all survey years 2004-2011. The sample excludes the rural population, 
those who were enrolled in school when surveyed, and those who have college degree. Degree attainments are defined in an 
exclusive way. 
 
Table A4 -  Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Individuals between 16 and 29 (Spain) 
         
  
Women 
 
Men 
         
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
         6 Years of Schooling or Less 
 
0.077 
 
0.267 
 
0.074 
 
0.261 
         8 Years of Schooling 
 
0.535 
 
0.499 
 
0.529 
 
0.499 
         10 Years of Schooling 
 
0.387 
 
0.487 
 
0.397 
 
0.489 
         % in Labor Force  
 
0.815 
 
0.388 
 
0.955 
 
0.207 
         % in Labor Force  
 
0.541 
 
0.498 
 
0.784 
 
0.411 
  
  
   
  
  Number of Observations  
 
24855     
 
37862   
          
Note: The sample contains individuals from age groups 16-19, 20-24, 25-29 from all survey years 1999-2004. The sample 
excludes those who were enrolled in school when surveyed, and those who have more than 10 years of schooling. Degree 
attainments are defined in an exclusive way. 
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 Table A5 - Descriptive Statistics for the Spanish Sample by Age and Schooling Level - Men 
        
 
1999-2000-2001 
 
2002-2003-2004 
        
 
10 Years 
or Less 
8 Years 
or Less 
6 Years 
or Less  
10 Years 
or Less 
8 Years  
or Less 
6 Years 
or Less 
  
        Ages 16-19 
        % in Labor Force  0.884 0.872 0.653 
 
0.945 0.928 0.840 
        % in Employed  0.594 0.587 0.372 
 
0.686 0.686 0.580 
        % in Employed within the LF 0.672 0.673 0.570 
 
0.726 0.739 0.691 
        % Married 0.006 0.008 0.018 
 
0.008 0.010 0.008 
        Ages 20-24 
        % in Labor Force  0.962 0.950 0.766 
 
0.971 0.962 0.819 
        % in Employed  0.783 0.776 0.514 
 
0.809 0.799 0.617 
        % in Employed within the LF  0.814 0.817 0.672 
 
0.833 0.830 0.754 
        % Married 0.055 0.063 0.110 
 
0.054 0.060 0.098 
        Ages 25-29 
        % in Labor Force  0.963 0.956 0.786 
 
0.966 0.959 0.774 
        % in Employed  0.826 0.817 0.580 
 
0.850 0.844 0.612 
        % in Employed within the LF  0.857 0.855 0.738 
 
0.880 0.881 0.790 
        % Married 0.278 0.298 0.273 
 
0.259 0.275 0.291 
        Note: The sample contains men from age groups 16-19, 20-24, 25-29 from all survey years 1999-2004. The sample excludes 
those who were enrolled in school when surveyed, and those who have more than 10 years of schooling. 
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 Table A6 - Descriptive Statistics for the Spanish Sample by Age and Schooling Level - Women 
        
 
1999-2000-2001 
 
2002-2003-2004 
        
 
10 Years 
or Less 
8 Years 
or Less 
6 Years 
or Less  
10Years 
or Less 
8 Years  
or Less 
6 Years 
or Less 
  
        Ages 16-19
        % in Labor Force  0.857 0.851 0.635 
 
0.822 0.787 0.589 
        % in Employed  0.453 0.465 0.296 
 
0.455 0.449 0.272 
        % in Employed within the LF 0.529 0.547 0.465 
 
0.554 0.571 0.461 
        % Married 0.045 0.054 0.094 
 
0.040 0.057 0.073 
        Ages 20-24 
        % in Labor Force  0.877 0.865 0.616 
 
0.875 0.851 0.631 
        % in Employed  0.586 0.580 0.358 
 
0.616 0.600 0.317 
        % in Employed within the LF  0.669 0.670 0.581 
 
0.704 0.705 0.548 
        % Married 0.189 0.206 0.279 
 
0.178 0.193 0.269 
        Ages 25-29 
        % in Labor Force  0.747 0.725 0.503 
 
0.779 0.749 0.536 
        % in Employed  0.499 0.475 0.269 
 
0.559 0.534 0.317 
        % in Employed within the LF  0.668 0.654 0.534 
 
0.718 0.713 0.591 
        % Married 0.565 0.586 0.503 
 
0.505 0.529 0.414 
        Note: The sample contains women from age groups 16-19, 20-24, 25-29 from all survey years 1999-2004. The sample excludes 
those who were enrolled in school when surveyed, and those who have more than 10 years of schooling. 
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Table A7 - The Effect of CMS on Labor Force Participation of Teenage Men (Pre-Recession Period) 
        
 
Men Aged 17-30
 
Men Aged 17-19 & 22-30 
        
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
        Panel 1 - Turkey vs. Peru (Peru is the default country) 
        Younger than 20*Turkey -0.141*** -0.055** -0.115*** 
 
-0.125*** -0.028 -0.097*** 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.006) 
Younger than 20 -0.017 -0.039** 0.006 
 
-0.048* -0.046*** 0.013 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) 
 
(0.016) (0.005) (0.012) 
Turkey 0.075*** 0.089*** -0.071*** 
 
0.116*** 0.263*** 0.178*** 
 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.003) 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
        Number of Observations 104,059 56,492 34,441 
 
94,450 52,161 32,086 
        Panel 2 - Turkey vs. Argentina (Argentina is the default country) 
        Younger than 20*Turkey -0.157*** 0.019 -0.038** 
 
-0.142*** 0.057** -0.001 
 
(0.016) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.013) 
Younger than 20 -0.010 -0.081*** -0.051* 
 
-0.039 -0.096*** -0.050** 
 
(0.011) (0.005) (0.019) 
 
(0.017) (0.014) (0.015) 
Turkey -0.052 -0.025 0.000 
 
-0.051 -0.028 0.003 
 
(0.024) (0.018) (0.015) 
 
(0.022) (0.017) (0.019) 
        Number of Observations 118,338 68,431 40,943 
 
106,686 62,387 37,817 
        Note: Each column presents results from a separate Linear Probability Model regression. The dependent variable is an indicator for 
being in the labor force. The regression model compares the teenage labor force participation in Turkey vs. Peru in Panel 1, and in 
Turkey vs. Argentina in Panel 2. The ages are grouped into two categories; men younger than 20, and men older than 21. Men older 
than 21 is the default category.  The variable of interest is theYounger than 20*Turkey. The sample in the separate columns contain 
individuals with HS degree or less, MS degree or less, and ES degree or less, respectively. I drop survey years after the global 
recession, 2008,2009, 2010, 2011. Each sample excludes women, rural population, and those who were enrolled in school when 
surveyed. All estimations control for survey year fixed effects and quadratic age trends. All estimations also control for GDP per 
capita, male labor force participation, and male unemployment rate of the countries. The first three columns contain men aged 17-
30, and the last three columns drop men at the age of 20 or 21 from the samples. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, 
clustered at the survey year level. 
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Table A8 - The Effect of CMS on Employment Likelihood of Teenage Men( Pre-Recession Period) 
        
 
Men Aged 17-30
 
Men Aged 17-19 & 22-30 
        
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
 
HS at Most MS at Most ES at Most 
        Panel 1 - Turkey vs. Peru (Peru is the default country) 
        Younger than 20*Turkey -0.039** 0.039 -0.081* 
 
-0.020 0.059* -0.079* 
 
(0.009) (0.021) (0.027) 
 
(0.014) (0.020) (0.032) 
Younger than 20 -0.019 -0.023 0.046 
 
-0.044* -0.027 0.045 
 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.027) 
 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.045) 
Turkey 0.273*** 0.485*** 0.148*** 
 
0.363*** 0.644*** 0.316*** 
 
(0.011) (0.020) (0.011) 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008) 
        Number of Observations 104,059 56,492 34,441 
 
94,450 52,161 32,086 
        Panel 2 - Turkey vs. Argentina (Argentina is the default country) 
        Younger than 20*Turkey -0.045* 0.106*** 0.033 
 
-0.025* 0.136*** 0.073* 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.030) 
 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.027) 
Younger than 20 -0.024 -0.074*** -0.045 
 
-0.058** -0.091*** -0.079** 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.030) 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.019) 
Turkey -0.024 0.013 0.096*** 
 
-0.035** 0.006 0.090*** 
 
(0.012) (0.019) (0.010) 
 
(0.011) (0.017) (0.013) 
        Number of Observations 118,338 68,431 40,943 
 
106,686 62,387 37,817 
        Note: Each column presents results from a separate Linear Probability Model regression. The dependent variable is an indicator for 
being employed. The regression model compares the teenage labor force participation in Turkey vs. Peru in Panel 1, and in Turkey 
vs. Argentina in Panel 2. The ages are grouped into two categories; men younger than 20, and men older than 21. Men older than 21 
is the default category.  The variable of interest is theYounger than 20*Turkey. The sample in the separate columns contain 
individuals with HS degree or less, MS degree or less, and ES degree or less, respectively. I drop survey years after the global 
recession, 2008,2009, 2010, 2011. Each sample excludes women, rural population, and those who were enrolled in school when 
surveyed. All estimations control for survey year fixed effects and quadratic age trends. All estimations control for GDP per capita, 
male labor force participation, and male unemployment rate of the countries.  The first three columns contain men aged 17-30, and 
the last three columns drop men at the age of 20 or 21 from the samples. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered 
at the survey year level. 
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Table A9 - Compulsory Military Service  
in European Union Member Countries 
   Country CMS exists  Abolished in 
   Austria Yes 
 Belgium No 1994 
Bulgaria  No 2008 
Croatia No 2008 
Cyprus Yes 
 Czech Republic No 2005 
Denmark Yes 
 Estonia Yes 
 Finland Yes 
 France  No 1997 
Germany  No 2011 
Greece Yes 
 Hungary No 2004 
Ireland No 
 Italy  No 2005 
Latvia No 2007 
Lithuania No 2008 
Luxembourg No 
 Malta No 
 Netherlands No 1997 
Poland No 2009 
Portugal No 2004 
Romania No 2007 
Slovakia No 2006 
Slovenia No 
 Spain No 2001 
Sweden  No 2010 
United Kingdom No 1960 
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Table A10 - Compulsory Military Service  
in NATO Member Countries 
   Country   CMS exists 
   Albania  
 
No 
Belgium  
 
No 
Bulgaria 
 
No 
Canada 
 
No 
Croatia 
 
No 
Czech Republic 
 
No 
Denmark 
 
Yes 
Estonia 
 
Yes 
France  
 
No 
Germany  
 
No 
Greece 
 
Yes 
Hungary 
 
No 
Iceland 
 
No 
Italy  
 
No 
Latvia 
 
No 
Lithuania 
 
No 
Luxembourg 
 
No 
Netherlands 
 
No 
Norway 
 
Yes 
Poland 
 
No 
Portugal 
 
No 
Romania 
 
No 
Slovakia 
 
No 
Slovenia 
 
No 
Spain 
 
No 
Turkey 
 
Yes 
United Kingdom 
 
No 
United States 
 
No 
 
